



Trade Relations on a War Footingt
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded the neighboring Persian Gulf state of
Kuwait.' President George Bush immediately issued two executive orders that
froze assets of the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait held in the United States,
imposed an embargo on trade between the United States and Iraq, and prohibited
other transactions relating to Iraq. 2 On August 9, 1990, President Bush, seeking
to align U.S. Persian Gulf policy with that of the United Nations, issued two
superseding executive orders that block assets of the Governments of Iraq and
Kuwait and entities owned or controlled by these governments; impose an em-
bargo on trade between the United States, and Iraq and Kuwait; and prohibit
several types of transactions conducted by U.S. persons that concern these two
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tAs this article goes to press, the exiled Kuwaiti Government is returning to power upon the end
of the Persian Gulf war. Thus, it appears that at least the Kuwaiti sanctions soon will be rescinded
(either incrementally or via one executive action). It is the authors' belief, however, that even to the
extent that this article evaluates sanctions which cease to be effective, it remains instructive as to new
themes and policies emerging in U.S. economic sanctions.
1. Washington Post, Aug. 3, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
2. Exec. Order 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (1990) (Iraq); Exec. Order 12,723, 55 Fed. Reg.
31,805 (1990) (Kuwait).
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countries. 3 Pursuant to authority granted by the executive orders, the Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) subsequently issued two
sets of regulations 4 that reiterate the prohibitions of the executive orders and
contain other provisions intended to give effect to the Bush administration's
sanctions policy.
This article analyzes the Iraq/Kuwait sanctions in the context of similar eco-
nomic sanctions and explores the practical economic effect that these sanctions
will have on U.S. persons doing business with Iraq or Kuwait.
I. Summary
The primary vehicles for the implementation of U.S. sanctions policy for Iraq
and Kuwait are two very similar sets of regulations issued by OFAC: the Iraqi
Sanctions Regulations (the ISRs)5 and the Kuwaiti Assets Control Regulations
(the KACRs). 6 As with earlier U.S. sanctions, the principal provisions of the
ISRs and the KACRs freeze assets of the target countries. These provisions
prohibit transactions concerning property or interests therein of either the Gov-
ernment of Iraq or the Government of Kuwait. The regulations also implement
a far-reaching embargo on trade between the United States, and Iraq and Kuwait.
Finally, the ISRs and the KACRs prohibit a wide range of transactions with the
intent of effecting a complete cessation of all unauthorized economic interactions
between Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
The assets freeze and the nonembargo prohibitions apply only to transactions
conducted by "U.S. persons," defined to include, inter alia, foreign branches of
U.S. corporations but not foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. The import
and export prohibitions are not limited to U.S. persons but, rather, cover all
transactions concerning goods, technology, and services subject to U.S. juris-
diction. U.S. persons who have failed to satisfy contractual obligations as a result
of the sanctions are shielded from liability in U.S. courts by an excuse provision
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the principal source of
authority for the ISRs and the KACRs. In foreign tribunals, performance of
contract obligations would appear to be excused in most cases by the doctrine
of force majeure.
The Iraq/Kuwait sanctions differ from other U.S. economic sanctions pro-
grams in two important respects, both of which will affect the administration and
3. Exec. Order 12,724, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (1990) (Iraq); Exec. Order 12,725, 55 Fed. Reg.
33,091 (1990) (Kuwait).
4. Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 2112-23 (1991) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt.
575); Kuwaiti Assets Control Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 49,856-869 (1990) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. pt. 570).
5. 56 Fed. Reg. 2112-23 (1991) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 575). Minor amendments to
the ISRs and new reporting requirements for a census of frozen assets and claims against the
Government of Iraq appear at 56 Fed. Reg. 5636-41 (1991).
6. 55 Fed. Reg. 49,856-869 (1990) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 570). Minor amendments
to the KACRs appear at 56 Fed. Reg. 5351-52 (1991).
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interpretation of the sanctions. First, they include a set of prohibitions, embodied
in the KACRs, which were issued to benefit, rather than to punish, the country
concerned. The KACRs were established to prevent Iraqi seizure of Kuwaiti
assets. Accordingly, the KACRs reflect the U.S. policy of permitting transactions
with the legitimate Kuwaiti Government to the extent that no benefit will accrue
to Iraq.
Second, unlike past U.S. sanctions, which largely have been unilateral efforts,
the Iraq/Kuwait sanctions are an integrated part of a coordinated multilateral
program. Thus, the KACRs sometimes recognize authorization for transactions
granted by other countries. This coordination with other countries should ame-
liorate concerns of extraterritorial over-reaching by the United States that have
accompanied other U.S. sanctions programs.
II. U.S. Economic Sanctions
With increasing frequency since World War II, the United States has used
economic sanctions 7 as a tool to address foreign policy crises. During most of the
twentieth century, emergency economic sanctions have been established prima-
rily under the statutory authority of Section 5 of the Trading with the Enemy Act
(TWEA). 8 Since its enactment in 1977, emergency economic sanctions have
been established primarily under the authority of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). 9 Emergency economic sanctions are adminis-
tered by OFAC.
IEEPA authorizes the President, when confronted with an unusual and ex-
traordinary threat, to exercise broad authority over financial transactions and
property after first declaring a national emergency. In particular, the President is
authorized to investigate, regulate, or prohibit (1) foreign exchange transactions,
(2) transfers of credit or payments through any banking institution if such pay-
7. The term "economic sanctions" has been usefully defined as "country-specific economic or
financial prohibition[s] imposed upon a target country or its nationals with the intended effect of
creating dysfunction in commercial and financial transactions with respect to a specified target, in the
service of specified foreign policy purposes." M. MALLOY, EcONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE
13 (1990); see also B. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONs 4 (1988).
8. 40 Stat. 415 (1917) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5), as amended. TWEA sanctions include
those against North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia, see Foreign Assets Control regulations, 31
C.F.R. pt. 500 (1990), and those against Cuba, see Cuban Assets Control regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt.
515 (1990).
A 1977 amendment restricts the President's authority to invoke TWEA powers to "times of the
war." Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626 (1977). IEEPA grants the President largely the same
powers as TWEA, a notable exception being the power to expropriate property in which a foreign
state or foreign national holds an interest. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (IEEPA powers) with 50
U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (TWEA powers). Interestingly, the Treasury Department determined that the
January 12, 1990, congressional resolution granting the President the authority to use force against
Iraq does not constitute a declaration of war that could be used to invoke TWEA. See Daily Report
for Executives (BNA), Jan. 18, 1991, at A-14.
9. Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706), as
amended.
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ments involve the interests of a foreign government or national, and (3) the
importation or exportation of currency or securities by any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States; or to assume complete authority in the regula-
tion of any acquisition, holding, use, transfer, importation, or exportation or any
transaction involving any property in which any foreign country or national has
an interest.' 0 IEEPA sanctions have been issued in response to actions by the
governments of Nicaragua,'' South Africa,' 2 Libya,' 3 and Panama. 14
Violations of orders, regulations, or licenses issued pursuant to IEEPA are
punishable by a civil penalty of $10,000.15 Willful violation of IEEPA sanctions
is a felony and anyone who willfully violates any license, order, or regulation
issued under the Act is subject to up to ten years' imprisonment, a fine of
$50,000, or both. 16 Any officer, director, or agent of a corporation who know-
ingly participates in such violations may face the same penalties. 17
Economic sanctions are also authorized by the United Nations Participation
Act of 1945 (the U.N. Act). 18 Section 5 of the U.N. Act 19 authorizes the
President to implement measures passed by the U.N. Security Council pursuant
to article 41 of the U.N. Charter, which concerns economic and communications
sanctions. 20 Section 5 provides for up to a $10,000 fine, ten years' imprison-
ment, or both, for willful violations of the orders, rules and regulations issued
under the section. 2i Before the Iraq/Kuwait crisis, the U.N. Act had been used
as authority for the issuance of economic sanctions only once pursuant to U.N.
resolutions relating to trade with Rhodesia.
22
III. The Iraq/Kuwait Sanctions
A. BACKGROUND
In quick response to the August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Pres-
ident issued two executive orders that blocked assets of the Governments of Iraq
10. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1702.
11. 31 C.F.R. pt. 540 (1990).
12. Id. pt. 545.
13. Id. pt. 550.
14. Id. pt. 565.
15. 50 U.S.C. § 1705.
16. id.
17. Id.
18. Pub. L. No. 264, 59 Stat. 619 (1945) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 287-287e), as amended.
19. Id. § 5, 59 Stat. at 620 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 287c), as amended.
20. While the U.N. Security Council Resolution on sanctions against Iraq, No. 661, does not
identify article 41 itself, it purports to be an action under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (Action
with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), which contains
article 41.
21. 22 U.S.C. § 287c(b). As with IEEPA, officers, directors, and agents of corporations who
knowingly participate in violations may be subject to the same punishments. See id. Unlike IEEPA,
the U.N. Act also provides for forfeiture of assets used in the course of a violation. See id.
22. See generally M. MALLOY, supra note 7, at 148-59.
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and Kuwait held in the United States and prohibited trade and other transactions
between the United States and Iraq. 23 According to the administration, the ex-
ecutive order blocking Kuwaiti assets was issued at the request of the legitimate
Kuwaiti Government to prevent its assets located in the United States from
falling into the hands of the Iraqis.
24
On August 6, 1990, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 661, which
imposed a duty on all U.N. members to:
" prohibit the importation of commodities and products originating in Iraq or
Kuwait;
* prohibit activities that promote exports from Iraq or Kuwait and dealings by
their citizens in commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait;
" proscribe the sale or supply of commodities or products to any person in
Iraq or Kuwait or to any person for the purposes of any business operating
from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities that promote such transactions; and
* prevent the supply of funds or other financial or economic resources to the
Government of Iraq or any commercial, industrial, or public utility under-
taking in Iraq or Kuwait.
Exceptions were established for exports and payments for medical or humani-
tarian purposes.
On August 9, 1990, the President issued two executive orders that superseded
the August 2 executive orders and modified U.S. sanctions to make them con-
form more closely to U.N. Resolution 661.25 Essentially identical in form,
executive orders 12,724 and 12,725 apply to transactions relating to Iraq and to
Kuwait, respectively. These executive orders implemented the sanctions prohi-
bitions much as they now appear in the sanctions regulations. Before the release
of the sanctions regulations, OFAC supplemented the executive orders with
guidance in the form of letters and a series of general licenses.26
In the days following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, most other countries,
including all major Western nations, established economic sanctions against Iraq
similar to those of the United States.27
B. REGULATIONS
OFAC issued the KACRs 28 and the ISRs29 on November 30, 1990, and Jan-
uary 18, 1991, respectively. As with the August 9 executive orders, the principal
23. Supra note 2.
24. See 55 Fed. Reg. 49,856 (1990).
25. Supra note 3.
26. Most of the general licenses which were released before the issuance of the sanctions
regulations were integrated into the regulations. See 55 Fed. Reg. 49,856 (1990); 55 Fed. Reg. 2112
(1991).
27. See generally Asset Freezing, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1990, 8-15.
28. Supra note 6.
29. Supra note 5.
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statutory authorities for both sets of regulations are IEEPA and section 5 of the
U.N. Act. 3 °
Though far-reaching and restrictive, the ISRs are fairly conventional in both
form and purpose. The KACRs, on the other hand, while appearing in a form
similar to other OFAC sanctions regulations, have been established for an un-
usual purpose- to protect the assets of a foreign country, here Kuwait. Accord-
ingly, the KACRs must be interpreted consistent with their purpose of protecting
Kuwaiti assets from plunder by Iraq despite the possibility that this could lead
to divergent readings of substantially identical language in the ISRs and the
KACRs.
Both of these sets of regulations differ from previous regulations in another
significant respect: they are part of a coordinated multilateral effort. Until this
point, U.S. sanctions programs almost exclusively have been unilateral efforts.
With the Iraq and Kuwait sanctions programs, the United States has integrated its
system of sanctions into the multilateral effort directed by the U.N., and this
integration is reflected in the ISRs and the KACRs.
3 1
1. Prohibitions
The ISRs and the KACRs establish substantially identical prohibitions on
conduct that are largely the same as those established in the August 9, 1990,
executive orders. The prohibitions fall into three categories: (1) a freeze of
assets, (2) a trade embargo, and (3) prohibitions on certain other transactions.
The regulations, however, introduce much interpretive language not included in
the executive orders. The prohibitions are effective absent a license or other
authorization from OFAC.
a. Freeze of Assets
The centerpieces of the ISRs and the KACRs are provisions that block assets.
Though not forfeited, blocked assets are removed from the owner's (or any other
person's) access absent OFAC authorization. The assets freeze provisions state
that no property, or interests therein, of the Government of Iraq 32 or the Gov-
30. See 55 Fed. Reg. 49,857 (1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 2113 (1991).
31. OFAC officials prepared the ISRs and the KACRs after consulting with their counterpart
officials from other countries in an attempt to make them harmonize with the sanctions of other
countries. See Daily Report for Executives (BNA), Aug. 28, 1990, at A-6.
32. The "Government of Iraq" is defined to include:
(a) The state and the Government of Iraq, as well as any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof.
including the Central Bank of Iraq;
(b) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization substantially owned or controlled by the
foregoing;
(c) Any person to the extent that such person is. or has been, or to the extent that there is reasonable cause to
believe that such person is. or has been, since the effective date, acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly on
behalf of any of the foregoing; and
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emnment of Kuwait that are now, or hereafter come, within the United States, or
that are now, or hereafter come, within the possession or control of a United
States person, 33 "may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise
dealt in." 34  This is standard language for sanctions regulations issued by
OFAC.
3 5
A principal way in which U.S. sanctions have achieved their noted breadth
of scope is through broad interpretation of assets freeze provisions. Of par-
ticular importance is the meaning of "interests in property." As do other
sanctions regulations, the ISRs and the KACRs define "interest" when used
with respect to property as "an interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or
indirect. ' 36  "Property" and "property interest" are also defined very
broadly. 37
Courts have held that for the purposes of U.S. economic sanctions, the def-
inition of "interest in property" is wider than the definition the phrase receives
in the context of traditional property law.38 A target country interest exists in
property located in the United States to which the target country has a contingent
(d) Any other person or organization determined by the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control to be
included within this section.
KACRs § 570.306; ISRs § 575.306. The "Government of Kuwait" is given a substantially
identical definition. KACRs § 570.307.
33. The regulations define "United States person" or "U.S. person" as "any United States
citizen; permanent resident alien; juridical person organized under the laws of the United States or
any jurisdiction within the United States, including foreign branches; or any person in the United
States." Id. § 570.321.
34. The frozen Kuwaiti assets consist principally of bank deposits, debt and equity securities,
and real estate; these assets are valued in the billions of dollars by OFAC. The frozen Iraqi assets
consist primarily of bank deposits and blocked oil payments; these assets are valued at approxi-
mately $1 billion by OFAC. Remarks prepared for presentation to the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protec-
tion and Competitiveness, February 21, 1991 [hereinafter Prepared Remarks, R. Newcomb,
OFAC].
35. Compare, e.g., Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.201 (1990).
36. KACRs § 570.308; ISRs § 575.308. Accord, e.g., Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R.
§ 550.315 (1990).
37. The regulations provide that:
The terms "property" and "property interest" include, but are not limited to. money, checks, drafts, bullion, bank
deposits, savings accounts, debts, indebtedness, obligations, notes, debentures, stocks, bonds coupons, soy other
financial instruments, banker's acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature of security,
warehouse receipts, bills of lading, trust receipts, bills of sale, any other evidences of title, ownership or indebtedness,
letters of credit any documents relating to any rights or obligations thereunder, powers of attorney, goods, wares,
merchandise, chattels, stocks on hand, ships, goods on ships, real estate mortgages, deeds of trust, vendor's sales
agreements, land contracts, leaseholds. ground rents, real estate and any other interest therein, options, negotiable
instruments, trade acceptances, royalties, book accounts, accounts payable, judgments, patents, trademarks or copy-
rights, insurance policies, safe deposit boxes and their contents, annuities, pooling agreements, services of any nature
whatsoever, contracts of any nature whatsoever, and any other property. real, personal or mixed, tangible or
intangible, or interest or interests therein, present, future or contingent.
KACRs § 570.315; ISRs § 575.315.
38. See M. MALLOY, supra note 7, at 299.
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contractual claim, 39 and in property that has left the target country and passed
through the hands of third-country nationals.4° Such a broad interpretation is
borne out in the ISRs and KACRs. Absent authorization, property that is trans-
ferred or subject to an attempted transfer to the Government of Iraq or the
Government of Kuwait is deemed to carry an interest of that Government. a'
Further, the regulations provide that the assets freeze provisions can apply to
offshore transactions conducted by U.S. persons such as the importation into
third countries of goods of Iraqi or Kuwaiti origin.42 The Iraqi or Kuwaiti interest
in the goods remains after the goods leave Iraq or Kuwait.
The regulations do place certain limits on the meaning of a target country
interest in property. Generally, if an authorized transaction results in the transfer
of property from Iraq or Kuwait, the Government of Iraq or the Government of
Kuwait will no longer be deemed to have an interest in the property. 43 Further-
more, interpretive provisions state that the Government of Iraq or the Govern-
ment of Kuwait will not be perceived as having an interest in goods that were
manufactured, consigned, or destined for export to Iraq or Kuwait if the Gov-
ernment of Iraq or the Government of Kuwait never held or received title to the
goods on or after August 9, 1990, and if any payment received for the goods is
placed in a blocked account. 44
Also, as part of the effort to coordinate with other countries, a transfer to or
from the Government of Kuwait (but not the Government of Iraq) that does not
involve a U.S. person "shall be recognized for the purposes" of the assets freeze
section if the transfer complied with host country implementation of applicable
U .N. Security Council resolutions (that is, Resolution 661) and was otherwise
laWful in the host country.45 An accompanying example indicates that, pursuant
to~this provision, the Government of Kuwait will no longer be deemed to retain
an interest in goods that have left Kuwait if the goods have been the subject of
a transaction that was lawful in a country that at the time maintained appropriate
implementation of Resolution 661.46
U.S. persons holding funds subject to the assets freeze are compelled to place
the funds in an interest-bearing "blocked account" in a U.S. financial institu-
39. See Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Miller, 504 F. Supp. 552, 557 (D.N.J. 1980) (applying The Iranian
Assets Control regulations).
40. See United States v. Brovernan, 180 F. Supp. 631, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (applying the
Foreign Assets Control regulations).
41. KACRs § 570.403; ISRs § 575.403.
42. See KACRs § 570.408; ISRs § 575.408. These interpretations of the asset freeze provisions
apply equally to the prohibitions on dealing with goods of Iraqi and Kuwaiti origin. See id.
43. KACRs § 570.403(a); ISRs § 575.403(a).
44. Id. §§ 570.413; ISRs § 575.413.
45. KACRs § 570.201(c).
46. Id. § 570.201(d).
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tion.47 Persons are forbidden to debit a blocked account to make payments on
obligations -even obligations that arose before the effective date of the assets
freeze, August 2, 1990.48
b. Trade Embargo
i. Import Prohibitions. Each set of regulations contains two provisions
that implement a trade embargo on Iraq and Kuwait. The first prohibits the
importation into the United States of goods or services of Iraqi and Kuwaiti
origin and also prohibits U.S. persons from taking action that promotes or is
intended to promote such importation. 49 The prohibitions apply to imports from
third countries of goods manufactured from Iraqi or Kuwaiti origin raw materials
or components regardless of the fact that such raw materials or components have
been substantially transformed by virtue of the manufacturing process. 50 Also,
the regulations prevent the importation of Iraqi and Kuwaiti origin goods for
transshipment or transit to other countries. 51 An interpretative provision of the
KACRs suggests (but does not explicitly state) that the KACRs import prohibi-
tion applies only to Kuwaiti origin goods that were exported from either Kuwait
or Iraq after the effective date of the prohibition, August 9, 1990.52
ii. Export Prohibitions. The second embargo provision states that "no
goods, technology (including technical data or other information), or services
may be exported from the United States, or, if subject to U.S. jurisdiction,
exported or reexported from a third country to [Iraq/Kuwait], to any entity
owned or controlled by the Government of [Iraq/Kuwait], or to any entity op-
erated from [Iraq/Kuwait]. ' '53 The export prohibitions have three components.
47. See KACRs §§ 570.203, 570.301; ISRs §§ 575.203, 575.301. In February 1991 OFAC
established a one-time reporting requirement for U.S. nationals holding assets of the Government of
Iraq as a census of Iraqi blocked assets. See 56 Fed. Reg. 5636-39 (1991). The aggregate size of
Iraqi blocked assets had been the subject of much speculation especially because of the potential use
of the pool to satisfy claims against Iraq arising from Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. See Daily Report
for Executives, Feb. 11, 1991, at A-8; infra section III.C (census of the claims of U.S. persons
against the Government of Iraq). The frozen Iraqi assets are valued at approximately $1 billion by
OFAC. Prepared Remarks, R. Newcomb, OFAC, supra note 34.
48. KACRs §§ 570.404; ISRs § 575.404.
49. KACRs § 570.204; ISRs § 575.204.
50. KACRs § 570.410(a); ISRs § 575.410.
51. KACRs § 570.409(b); ISRs § 575.409(b).
52. See KACRs § 570.410(b). Limiting the import prohibition to goods that left the target
country after the effective date would help ameliorate enforcement difficulties with respect to ship-
ments of fungible goods, such as oil, for which it can be very difficult to determine the country of
origin. Note that the prohibitions on dealings in Iraqi and Kuwaiti property, KACRs § 570.206 and
ISRs § 575.206, are limited to property that left these countries after the effective date of these
prohibitions, Aug. 9, 1990.
53. KACRs § 570.205; ISRs § 575.205. Though not stated clearly in any official publication, it
appears that the export control authority of the sanctions supersedes that of the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. pts. 768-799, which are promulgated and administered by the U.S.
Commerce Department under the authority of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401 et seq. Cf. Exec. Order 12,724, § 5, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (1990); Exec. Order 12,725, § 5,
SUMMER 1991
400 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
First, they prohibit the export of goods, technology, or services from the terri-
torial United States to Iraq and Kuwait or to an Iraqi or Kuwaiti entity. Second,
because the participation by a U.S. person in the transaction would confer U.S.
jurisdiction, the export prohibitions forbid U.S. persons to export goods, tech-
nology, or services from any location to Iraq or Kuwait or to an Iraqi or Kuwaiti
entity.
54
Third, unlike other OFAC sanctions, the export prohibitions explicitly cover
exports and reexports from third countries. The language of limitation, that the
export must be "subject to U.S. jurisdiction," is not defined in the regulations.5 6
While the executive orders that authorize the sanctions regulations suggest that
the sanctions export prohibitions proscribe only third-country exports covered by
previously existing U.S. export controls,57 the sanctions regulations have left
this issue far less clear.
Interpretive provisions of the sanctions regulations do give guidance on when
a U.S. person can be liable under the export prohibitions for exports that are
diverted or reexported to Iraq or Kuwait. The regulations forbid exports from the
United States to third-countries if the exporter knows or has reason to know that
the exported commodity is intended for transshipment to Iraq or Kuwait.5 8
55 Fed. Reg. 33,091 (1990). Thus, if recent practice relative to OFAC sanctions is followed, OFAC
specific licenses issued under the KACRs and the ISRs will satisfy the requirements of the EAR for
the purposes of exports covered by the OFAC license. Cf. 15 C.F.R. § 790.7(c) (OFAC licenses
covering exports to Libya satisfy EAR licensing requirements). It is likely, however, that Commerce
Department controls apply to exports that OFAC removes from the scope of the prohibitions of the
ISRs and the KACRs through, e.g., general licenses. The relationship between the sanctions and
other U.S. export controls such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. pts.
120-130, promulgated and administered by the U.S. State Department under the Arms Export
Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778, is less clear. In sum, the issue of interagency export control
jurisdiction in this area is unsettled, fluid, and responsive to rapidly changing Persian Gulf devel-
opments.
54. On the jurisdictional concept of the "U.S. person," see infra notes 77-81 and accompa-
nying text.
55. Other U.S. export prohibitions sanctions cover only exports from the territorial United
States. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 550.202 (Libyan Sanctions Regulations); 15 C.F.R. § 790.7 (Com-
merce Department general order indicating that while exports to Libya are governed under the
Treasury Department's Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 550, reexports to Libya would
continue to be governed under the Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. pts. 668-799).
56. For traditional interpretations of the extent of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction, see generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402, 403 and
accompanying comments and reporters' notes [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
57. See Exec. Order 12,724, § 2(b), 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (1990); Exec. Order 12,725, § 2(b),
55 Fed. Reg. 33,091 (1990) (export prohibitions proscribe exports "either (i) from the United States,
or (ii) requiring the issuance of a license by a Federal agency"). Export Administration regulations
controls on third-country exports are located at, e.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 774, 776.12, 779.8.
58. KACRs § 570.411 (a); ISRs § 575.411. These two provisions are not identical; as indicated
below, KACRs § 570.411(a) suggests that as to products that are eventually shipped to Kuwait,
liability generally will not lie if the export is "substantially transformed or incorporated into man-
ufactured products in a third country." Also, the export prohibitions prevent one from importing for
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Furthermore, exports intended specifically for incorporation or substantial trans-
formation into third country products are prohibited if the product is to be used
in Iraq or Kuwait, if the product is being manufactured to fill an Iraqi or Kuwaiti
order, or if the manufacturer's sales of the product are predominantly to Iraq or
Kuwait. 59
The ISRs effectively prevent U.S. persons from exporting if the U.S. person
has reason to believe the foreign recipient of the export may do business with
Iraq-whether the export will be substantially transformed is immaterial. The
KACRs, on the other hand, give the exporter more comfort. First, the KACRs
contain a "safe harbor," which provides that exports to third countries are not
prohibited as long as the exporter has reason to believe that the export will come
to rest in a third country for purposes other than reexport to Kuwait. 60 Second,
the KACRs suggest that an exporter will not be liable for exports to third
countries that are "substantially transformed or incorporated into manufactured
products" even if the finished product is shipped to Kuwait, provided the fin-
ished product was not intended for use in Kuwait, the finished product was not
specifically manufactured to fill a Kuwaiti order, and the manufacturer's sales are
not predominantly to Kuwait. 61 As most other countries have established controls
on exports to Iraq and Kuwait, these diversion and reexport issues are not
significant at present because few exports are made to Iraq and Kuwait from any
country. However, as other countries begin lifting their Iraq/Kuwait controls,
these issues will become more important.
In keeping with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 661, the prohibitions on
exports makes an exception for foodstuffs and medical supplies. 62 The regula-
tions provide that specific licenses will be granted to permit exports of foodstuffs
and medical supplies to Iraq and Kuwait only in accordance with U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 661 and 666.63 Resolution 666 provides for procedures
whereby the Security Council determines when certain humanitarian circum-
stances have arisen and that, in such case, foodstuffs are to be provided to Iraq
and Kuwait through the United Nations in cooperation with appropriate human-
itarian agencies and distributed by those agencies or under their supervision.
iii. Enforcement of the Trade Embargo. The U.S. Customs Service has
the responsibility of enforcement of U.S. trade restrictions. Customs has been
active in conducting criminal investigations involving attempts to circumvent the
trade embargo against Iraq. To date, Customs has identified attempts by the
transshipment or transit goods intended or destined for Iraq or Kuwait. ISRs § 575.409(a);
KACRs § 570.409(a).
59. KACRs § 570.41 1(a); ISRs § 575.411.
60. KACRs § 570.412(b).
61. See id. § 570.411(a).
62. See KACRs § 570.205; ISRs § 575.205.
63. KACRs § 570.520; ISRs § 575.520.
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Iraqis to import chemical warfare precursors, foodstuffs, gas masks and protec-
tive clothing, ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles, missile technology, radar
systems and parts, and water purification chemicals and systems.
64
In addition to conducting criminal investigations Customs has effected over
seventy seizures of goods destined for Iraq or Kuwait; the value of the goods
seized is nearly $10,000,000.65 Goods seized include air conditioners and spare
parts, aircraft spare parts, automobile spare parts, gas turbine engine spare parts,
jet aviation fuel, lubricants, and tires. 6 6
c. Prohibition of Certain Transactions
Lastly, the ISRs and the KACRs contain a series of prohibitions of other
transactions. The regulations prohibit:
" U.S. persons from dealing in property of Iraqi or Kuwaiti origin exported
from Iraq or Kuwait after August 6, 1990, or property intended for expor-
tation from Iraq or Kuwait to any country, or exportation to Iraq or Kuwait
from any country; U.S. persons are also forbidden from engaging in any
activity that promotes or is intended to promote such dealing;
67
" U.S. persons from engaging in any transaction relating to travel by a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident alien to or within Iraq or Kuwait after the
effective date, August 9, 1990, except for travel relating to departures from
Iraq, official Government or U.N. business, or journalistic activity; 68
" transactions by U.S. persons relating to transportation to or from Iraq or
Kuwait, the provision of transportation to or from the United States by Iraqi
or Kuwaiti persons, or the sale within the United States by persons holding
authority under the Federal Aviation Act of 195869 of transportation by air
that includes a stop in Iraq or Kuwait;
70
* the performance by U.S. persons "of any contract, including a financing
contract, in support of an industrial, commercial, public utility, or Govern-
mental project in [Iraq/Kuwait];" 7'
" U.S. persons to "commit or transfer, direct or indirect, funds or other
financial or economic resources to the Government of [Iraq/Kuwait] or any
64. Prepared remarks of John Kelley, Jr., Director, Strategic Investigations Division, U.S.
Customs Service, presented to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness, February 21, 1991.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. ISRs §§ 575.206. Note that the effect of this prohibition is very similar to that of the freeze
of assets. Compare supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
68. KACRs § 570.207. The regulations provide a definition of "journalist." KACRs § 570.416;
ISRs § 575.416.
69. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-04.
70. KACRs § 570.208; ISRs § 575.208.
71. KACRs § 570.209; ISRs § 575.209.
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other person in [Iraq/Kuwait]"; 72 this prohibition applies to the renewal of
credits or loans that took effect prior to the effective date, August 9, 1990;
7 3
* transactions that have the purpose or effect of evading or avoiding, or that
facilitate the evasion or avoidance of, the prohibitions of the regulations;
also prohibited are attempts and conspiracies to violate the prohibitions.74
2. Penalties
As part of the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990,75 Congress provided for penalties
for violations of the ISRs and the KACRs over and above those provided for in
IEEPA and the U.N. Act.76 Thus, any violation, evasion, or attempted violation
or evasion of the regulations may subject the perpetrator to a fine of $250 000.77
A person other than a natural person who is convicted of a willful violation or
evasion, or of an attempted violation or evasion, may be subject to a fine of not
more than $1,000,000.78 A natural person convicted of a willful violation or
evasion, or of an attempted violation or evasion, may be subject to a fine of not
more than $1,000,000, imprisonment for more than twelve years, or both.7 9 An
officer, director, or agent of any corporation who knowingly participates in a
violation, evasion, or attempted violation or evasion may be subject to the
aforementioned fine, imprisonment, or both. 80
3. Scope Issues
In analyzing the scope of the sanctions, it is useful to explore certain juris-
dictional concepts employed by the regulations. Furthermore, it is useful to
evaluate these concepts in the context of earlier sanctions. While the sanctions
will clearly have their desired effect of foreclosing prospective business between
the United States and Iraq, it is noteworthy that the reach of the regulations is not
as expansive as the reach asserted in earlier sanctions.
Because most other countries have established similar sanctions, it presently
would be of little benefit to attempt to conduct prohibited transactions outside the
jurisdictional scope of U.S. sanctions. However, these scope issues will grow in
importance as other countries begin disassembling their sanctions programs.
72. KACRs § 570.210; ISRs 575.210.
73. KACRs § 570.406(a); ISRs § 575.406.
74. KACRs § 570.211; ISRs § 575.211.
75. See infra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
77. KACRs § 570.701; ISRs § 575.701.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. As indicated in the regulations, the provisions of the U.N. Act section that provide for
the forfeiture of assets used in the course of a violation, 22 U.S.C. § 287c(b), remain applicable. See
KACRs § 570.701(b) (56 Fed. Reg. 5352 (1991)); ISRs § 575.701(b).
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a. "U.S. Person"
Aside from the embargo provisions, the regulations control only transactions
conducted by "U.S. persons." As indicated earlier, a "U.S. person" is defined
as "any United States citizen; permanent resident alien; juridical person orga-
nized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United
States, including foreign branches; or any person in the United States." 8' Im-
portantly, the definition of "U.S. person" contemplates foreign branches of
U.S. corporations, but not foreign companies owned by U.S. persons, for ex-
ample, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.
In employing the jurisdictional concept of the "U.S. person," the sanctions
are consistent with the recent U.S. policy of limiting the extraterritorial reach of
economic sanctions. Earlier sanctions such as the Foreign Assets Control Reg-
ulations generally applied to transactions conducted by "persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," defined to include foreign corporations owned
or controlled by U.S. citizens, U.S. business entities, and persons within the
United States. 82 The asserted jurisdiction by the United States over foreign sub-
sidiaries of U.S. corporations has been a source of considerable controversy.
83
Interestingly, the sanctions trade embargo provisions, the prohibitions on im-
ports from Iraq and Kuwait and exports to Iraq and Kuwait, are not limited by
the "U.S. person" concept. As indicated above, the export prohibitions govern
any exports "subject to U.S. jurisdiction. ' 84 Accordingly, these provisions
could be interpreted to extend to the full measure of U.S. extraterritorial juris-
diction, which historically has been considered to reach foreign U.S.-owned
companies. Thus, the sanctions could be interpreted to prohibit, for example,
an export to Iraq by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation.
b. "Government of Iraq/Kuwait"
Earlier sanctions blocked property of both the government of the sanctioned
country and nationals of that country.86 The Iraq/Kuwait sanctions freeze of
assets, however, applies only to property and interests in property of the "Gov-
ernment of Iraq" and the "Government of Kuwait," both of which are defined
very broadly to include any entity under government control. 87 The scope of the
81. Supra note 33.
82. 31 C.F.R. § 500.329 (1990).
83. See, e.g., Moyer & Mabrey, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History,
Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons in Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL'v INT'L Bus. 1 (1983). Even
U.S. sanctions that employ the "U.S. person" jurisdictional limit have precipitated controversies
relating to extraterritoriality. See M. MALLOY, supra note 7, at 616-20 (describing Libyan Arab
Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1988] 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 259).
84. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 56, §§ 403(1), 414.
86. E.g., 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1990) (Foreign Assets Control Regulations).
87. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Similarly, the Libyan Sanctions Regulations asset
freeze is limited to property of the "Government of Libya." 31 C.F.R. § 550.289 (1990).
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Government of Iraq and the Government of Kuwait is also germane to the export
prohibitions, which prohibit exports not only to the target countries but also to
entities owned or controlled by these Governments.
The limitation on the freeze of assets to property of the Government of Iraq is
probably of little consequence. Because of the breadth of the definition of the
Government of Iraq and statist policies of the Iraqi Government, virtually any
Iraqi entity with which a U.S. person would trade would be included within the
sanctions' definition of the government. 88 This is especially true in light of the
U.S. intention to withhold from Iraq the benefits of trade with the United States
to the greatest extent possible.
The limitation on the asset freeze to property of the Government of Kuwait
and the prohibition on exports to government-controlled entities are administered
in light of the U.S. policy of permitting transactions with Kuwaiti entities to the
extent that no benefit will accrue to the Hussein regime in Iraq. OFAC does
appear to consider the recognized Kuwaiti Government in exile to be the "Gov-
ernment of Kuwait" for the purposes of the KACRs. However, OFAC will grant
blanket authority for transactions with an entity controlled by the Kuwaiti Gov-
ernment after ensuring that the entity is not controlled by the Government of
Iraq. Note again, however, that the limitation on the scope of the sanctions to the
"Government of [Iraq/Kuwait]" generally applies only to the asset freeze; most
of the other prohibitions are not so limited.
4. Licenses and Licensing Policy
OFAC generally authorizes transactions that would otherwise be subject to
sanctions prohibitions through general and specific licenses. General licenses
authorize categories of transactions and are included in the text of the ISRs and
the KACRs. Specific licenses are issued by OFAC upon application to cover
identified sets of facts.89 While specific licenses are ordinarily issued to cover
particular transactions or sets of transactions, OFAC has begun issuing unusually
broad specific licenses under the KACRs to permit business between U.S.
persons and Kuwaiti entities to the extent that no benefit will accrue to Iraq.
Generally, a license for a transaction authorizes any other transaction which is
88. To facilitate identification of Iraqi fronts and agents attempting to circumvent the embargo,
OFAC has the authority to publicly identify or "specially designate," any person who is directly or
indirectly owned or controlled by the Government of Iraq or who has acted for or on its behalf. See
Prepared Remarks, R. Newcomb, OFAC, supra note 34. A Specially Designated National (SDN) of
the Iraqi Government is a representative, agent, front, etc. located outside of Iraq that functions as
an extension of the Government of Iraq. Id. Since the Iraqi Government tends to operate its inter-
national fronts as interlocking networks of companies and key individuals, it is important to realize
that under this program any identified Iraqi SDN is by definition the "Government of Iraq." Id.
89. The regulations distinguish between general and specific licenses largely on the simple basis
of whether or not they appear in the regulations, general licenses being those that do so appear and
specific licenses being those that do not. See KACRs §§ 570.305, 570.316; ISRs §§ 575.305,
575.316.
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"ordinarily incident" to the licensed transaction and "necessary to give effect
thereto.' ,9
Just as the two sets of regulations are facially similar in most other respects,
the provisions on licenses and licensing are similar, and the ISRs include most of
the same types of general licenses included in the KACRs. However, the differ-
ent policies that underlie the two sets of regulations will become apparent in the
implementation of licensing policies for each. Accordingly, it is likely that OFAC
will interpret the general licenses of the ISRs more narrowly than those of the
KACRs and be far less likely to grant specific licenses for transactions relating
to Iraq than for those relating to Kuwait.
a. General Licenses and Statements of Licensing Policy
The ISRs and the KACRs include (1) general licenses for certain financial
transactions relating to Iraqi and Kuwaiti entities; (2) general licenses and state-
ments of licensing policy relating to certain import/export transactions with Iraqi
and Kuwaiti entities; and (3) a miscellaneous set of general licenses and state-
ments of licensing policy for various other types of transactions relating to Iraq
and Kuwait. The general licenses provide all authority necessary to perform a
transaction, but they sometimes require the parties to a transaction covered by
the license to fulfill certain reporting requirements. The statements of licensing
policy convey a willingness to consider issuing specific licenses to cover iden-
tified types of transactions on a case-by-case basis.
i. General Licenses for Certain Financial Transactions. A group of gen-
eral licenses permit financial transactions, otherwise prohibited by the assets
freeze provisions, that concern assets belonging to the Governments of Iraq and
Kuwait, that is, the Iraqi Government and the exiled Kuwaiti Government and
entities under their control. General licenses applying specifically to assets of
these governments are necessary because the assets freeze provisions apply only
to assets in which the Governments of Iraq or Kuwait hold an interest.
The principal general licenses in this regard permit the payment of funds or the
transfer of credits or other assets into blocked accounts in the names of the
Government of Iraq or Government of Kuwait. 9 ' A transfer can be made under
these licenses from a blocked account provided such a transfer does not repre-
sent, directly or indirectly, a transfer of an interest from the Government of Iraq
or Kuwait to another person. Thus, the licenses do not authorize transfers from
90. See KACRs § 570.418; ISRs § 575.418. A license for a transaction does not authorize an
associated debit to a blocked account or an associated transaction with a "blocked person," an
individual or entity controlled by the Government of Kuwait that has not obtained an operating license.
Id.; KACRs app. A (see infra note 110).
91. KACRs § 570.503; ISRs § 575.503. Further requirements must be met for payments by
issuing or confirming banks under standby letters of credit in favor of Iraqi or Kuwaiti beneficiaries.
See KACRs § 570.518; ISRs § 575.518.
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one blocked account into another blocked account held under a different name.
Also, these licenses do not authorize a transfer of credit that is an integral part
of a transaction that itself must be licensed. The KACRs provision, section
570.503, operates in tandem with section 570.512 of the KACRs, which autho-
rizes U.S. financial institutions to invest and reinvest Government of Kuwait
funds held in blocked accounts.92
A set of three general licenses permit the completion of certain transactions
provided the transactions were initiated before the effective date of the assets
freeze, August 2, 1990. These licenses authorize (1) U.S. financial institutions
to complete foreign exchange, securities, and commodities transactions with or
on behalf of the Government of Kuwait in connection with contracts executed
before the effective date (not in the ISRs); 9 3 (2) persons other than the Govern-
ments of Iraq or Kuwait to buy, sell, or satisfy obligations on bankers accep-
tances, and to pay under deferred payment undertakings, for example, letters of
credit, that involve an interest of the Government of Iraq or Government of
Kuwait provided the obligation arose before the effective date;94 and (3) pay-
ments to U.S. persons on obligations of the Government of Iraq or Government
of Kuwait provided the obligation arose before the effective date.95
ii. General Licenses and Statements of Licensing Policy for Certain Import/
Export Transactions. The ISRs and the KACRs contain general licenses
authorizing certain exports such as baggage shipments, 96 shipments to Gov-
ernment personnel, 97 shipments for official U.N. business,98 and imports for
diplomatic or support personnel of the Government of Iraq or the reorganized
Government of Kuwait. 99 The regulations also provide that specific licenses
will be issued on a case-by-case basis to permit exports to Iraq and Kuwait of
donated food and medical supplies. In accordance with U.N. Security Council
Resolution 666, these licenses for humanitarian exports will generally be
92. The analogous ISRs provision that permits certain transfers into blocked accounts, section
575.503, similarly refers to an ISRs § 575.512, but the ISRs do not contain such a section.
93. KACRs § 570.504. Assets to be paid to the Government of Kuwait must be placed in a
blocked account. Id.
94. KACRs § 570.505(a); ISRs § 575.505(a). Persons other than the Governments of Iraq or
Kuwait are authorized to complete the same types of transactions in connection with imports and
exports to and from Iraq or Kuwait that do not involve an interest of the Governments of Iraq or
Kuwait provided the bankers acceptances or the deferred payment undertakings were accepted before
the effective date. KACRs § 570.505(b); ISRs § 575.505(b).
95. KACRs § 570.506; ISRs § 575.506. The license does not authorize payments from blocked
accounts Id. The ISRs § 575.506(c) contains a provision, not included in the KACRs § 570.506,
requiring that notice be provided to OFAC of transactions made under this general license.
96. KACRs § 570.507(a)(1); ISRs § 575.507(a)(1). These transactions must qualify under Ex-
port Administration regulations General License BAGGAGE, 15 C.F.R. § 771.6 (1990).
97. KACRs § 570.507(a)(1), ISRs § 575.507(a)(1). These transactions must qualify under
Export Administration regulations General License GUS, 15 C.F.R. § 771.13 (1990).
98. KACRs § 570.507(a)(2); ISRs § 575.507(a)(2).
99. KACRs § 570.519; ISRs § 575.519.
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granted only for shipments through the Red Cross or other appropriate human-
itarian agencies. too
As with the general licenses relating to financial transactions, there are pro-
visions in the regulations relating to uncompleted import and export transactions
that were initiated before the effective dates of the embargo prohibitions, August
2, 1990 (ISRs) and August 9, 1990 (KACRs). Specific licenses will be granted
to permit payment by U.S. financial institutions under irrevocable letters of
credit' 01 for exports to Iraq or Kuwait or to third countries for entities operated
from Iraq or Kuwait, provided the export occurred before the effective date or,
if it was after the effective date, an effort was made to prevent delivery.' 0 2 Also,
with respect to export transactions initiated before the effective date, procedures
are provided for the retrieval of goods seized before exportation. 103
iii. Miscellaneous General Licenses and Statements of Licensing Policy.
Both the ISRs and the KACRs authorize certain transactions relating to
telecommunications' 0 4 and the transmission of mail ° 5 between the United
States, and Iraq and Kuwait. The KACRs also authorize transactions relating to
the registration and renewal of Kuwaiti intellectual property rights,' 6 and pro-
vide that specific licenses will be issued to permit payment to U.S. persons for
the provision of professional services. 10 7 These provisions are not contained
in the ISRs.
b. Specific Licenses
In conformity with U.S. and U.N. policy to sever Iraq from the world econ-
omy, OFAC will probably issue very few specific licenses under the ISRs. In
marked contrast, OFAC has and will continue to license all transactions with
Kuwaiti entities provided it is confident that the subject transaction will not
generate a benefit to Iraq. This policy typically entails authorizing transactions
conducted by Government-owned or controlled Kuwaiti entities that would
otherwise be prohibited by the KACRs asset freeze or export prohibition. 0 8
In this regard, OFAC has begun issuing to Kuwaiti entities unusually broad
specific licenses under the KACRs, which cover categories and types of trans-
100. KACRs §§ 570.520, 570.521; ISRs §§ 575.520, 575.5221.
101. The KACRs refer more generally to payment under "a financing arrangement requiring
payment by a U.S. financial institution." KACRs § 570.5 10(a); cf. ISRs § 575.510(a).
102. KACRs § 570.510(a)(2); ISRs § 575.510(a)(2).
103. KACRs § 570.517; ISRs § 575.517.
104. KACRs § 570.513; ISRs § 575.513.
105. KACRs § 570.514; ISRs § 575.514.
106. KACRs § 570.516.
107. Id. § 570.515.
108. The assets freeze prohibits transactions that concern property of the "Government of Ku-
wait," which is defined broadly to include entities owned or controlled by the Kuwaiti Government.
See KACRs §§ 570.201, 570.307. Likewise, the export prohibition proscribes exports to the Gov-
emnment of Kuwait and entities under its ownership or control. Id. § 570.205.
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actions.' 0 9 A subset of these broad specific licenses, new to OFAC licensing
practices, are called "operating licenses." OFAC began issuing operating li-
censes to Government-owned or controlled Kuwaiti entities in the United States
to permit them to continue business operations.' 10 Operating licenses authorize
transactions with U.S. persons, sometimes under restrictions such as reporting
requirements. Kuwaiti-controlled entities that hold operating licenses are free to
transact with each other."'
c. Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990
On November 5, 1990, the President signed into law the congressional input
on sanctions against Iraq: The Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (the Sanctions Act). ' 12
As opposed to the regulations, which are directed at private activity, the Sanc-
tions Act is intended primarily to ensure that agencies of the federal Government
do not take actions that benefit Iraq. Identified as supplementary to the admin-
istration's measures, the Sanctions Act's sanctions include:
" a prohibition on foreign military sales under the Arms Export Control
Act;i 13
" a prohibition on the issuance of State Department export licenses for ex-
ports of United States Munitions List items to Iraq;'
4
" a directive to prohibit exports to Iraq of goods and technology controlled
under the Export Administration Act of 1979;' 
l5
" a directive to prohibit the export and distribution of nuclear equipment,
materials, and technology controlled under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
109. Acting under a broad specific license of this type, the exiled Kuwaiti Government recently
initiated an acquisition program to facilitate the post-restoration reconstruction of Kuwait's infra-
structure, which has been damaged by the Iraqi occupation. See Daily Report for Executives (BNA),
Jan. 18, 1991, at A-14.
110. The KACRs contain an appendix that provides guidance on what Kuwaiti entities held op-
erating licenses at the time the KACRs were issued (November 30, 1990). The appendix lists Kuwaiti
entities in three categories. Entities in the first category, "Controlled/Blocked," are considered to be
controlled by the Government of Kuwait and/or the Government of Iraq and blocked. The KACRs
prohibitions apply to these entities. The second category, "Controlled/Licensed to Operate," con-
tains entities that are controlled by the recognized Kuwaiti Government in exile but hold operating
licenses. Entities in the last category, "Not Controlled/No Restrictions," are considered to be free
from Government control.
111. KACRs § 570.417.
112. The Sanctions Act was passed as §§ 586-586(j) of the Foreign Operations Authorization and
Appropriation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1979, 2047-55 (1990). Other bills have
been introduced in Congress to punish foreign companies that violate the sanctions as mandated by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 661. See Daily Report for Executives (BNA), Jan. 7, 1991, at
A-1.
113. Sanctions Act § 586G(a)(1). The Arms Export Control Act is codified, as amended, at 22
U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796d.
114. Sanctions Act § 586G(a)(2). The United States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. pt. 121, consists
of those items designated by the President as defense articles and defense services. See 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778.
115. Sanctions Act § 586G(a)(3). The Export Administration Act of 1979 is codified, as
amended, at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420.
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and to prohibit the issuance of specific authorizations under section 57b(2)
of the Atomic Energy Act;''
6
" a requirement that the United States shall oppose loans or financial assis-
tance to Iraq by international financial institutions (for example, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the World Bank) in which the United States
participates; 
17
" a prohibition on the issuance of credits and credit guarantees through the
Import-Export Bank to Iraq;" 
8
* a prohibition on Commodity Credit Corporation assistance to Iraq; 119
* a general prohibition on foreign aid to Iraq under the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act. 120
The Sanctions Act also identifies Iraq as "a country which has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism."' 2 1 This identification im-
plicates other statutes that authorize sanctions including section 40 of the Arms
Export Control Act,' 22 section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,123
and section 555 of the International Security and Development Act of 1985.124
The Sanctions Act also contains provisions that relate to the administration's
sanctions. First, the Act requires the President to notify Congress at least fifteen
days prior to termination of any sanction. Second, the Act defines the exemption
under the regulations for transactions involving foodstuffs or payments for
foodstuffs "in humanitarian circumstances" to include only those transactions
consistent with U.N. Resolution 666 and other relevant Security Council reso-
lutions. Lastly, as indicated earlier, the Sanctions Act mandates stiffer penalties
for violations of the regulations than those provided for by IEEPA and the U.N.
Act. 125
116. Sanctions Act § 586G(a)(4). The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is codified, as amended, at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296. Section 57b(2) of this Act requires the Secretary of Energy to determine that
production of special nuclear material outside of the United States will not be inimical to the interest
of the United States before the Secretary can authorize such production.
117. Sanctions Act § 586G(a)(5).
118. Id. § 586G(a)(6).
119. Id. § 586G(a)(7).
120. Id. § 586G(a)(8). The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is codified, as amended, at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2151-2496.
121. Sanctions Act § 586F(c).
122. See supra note 113.
123. Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2371. This
section prohibits the provision of assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Agricul-
tural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, the Peace Corps Act or the Export-Import Act
of 1945 to any country determined to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
124. Section 555 of the International Security and Development Act of 1985 states that it is the
sense of the Congress that the President should seek to effect an international boycott of countries that
have been determined to have supported international terrorism.
125. Sanctions Act § 586E.
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IV. Economic Implications of the Iraq/Kuwait Sanctions
A. EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON BUSINESS WITH IRAQ AND KUWAIT
1. Prospective Effect
The Iraq/Kuwait sanctions are intended to prohibit transactions by U.S. per-
sons that could benefit the Hussein regime in Iraq. The sanctions are com-
prehensive in effecting this purpose. In particular, they virtually foreclose the
possibility of conducting business with entities in Iraq. The sanctions are not
intended to prohibit business with legitimate Kuwaiti entities, that is, those not
controlled by the Government of Iraq. Accordingly, the regulations and OFAC
licensing policies serve to facilitate business activity between United States
persons and legitimate Kuwaiti entities.
2. Effect of Sanctions on Preexisting
Contractual Rights and Obligations
As a general rule, the sanctions prohibit the performance of proscribed trans-
actions as of the effective date of the prohibitions.' 26 Absent authorization, it is
immaterial that contractual rights and obligations preexisted the sanctions. For
example, the sanctions generally prohibit payments by U.S. banks under a con-
firming letter of credit established to facilitate payment for a shipment of goods
to an entity controlled by the Government of Iraq or Government of Kuwait
despite the fact that the export was completed before the Iraqi invasion. 1 27
B. EXCUSE FOR NONPERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
That a contract party is prevented from performing contractual obligations by
the Iraq/Kuwait sanctions does not necessarily mean that the party will be civilly
liable for breach of contract. Statutory excuse provisions and common law doc-
trines may excuse nonperformance.
1. IEEPA Section 2
Section 2 of IEEPA provides:
Compliance with any regulation, instruction, or direction issued under this chapter
shall to the extent thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of the
obligation of the person making the same. No person shall be held liable in any court
for or with respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the
administration of, or pursuant to and in reliance on, this chapter, or any regulation,
instruction, or direction issued under this chapter. 128
126. The effective dates of the prohibitions are identified at KACRs § 570.212 and ISRs § 575.212.
127. Payment would violate the asset freeze provisions of the regulations. The regulations do,
however, contain a general license that would permit payment to the exporter provided no debit is
made to a blocked account. KACRs § 570.506; ISRs § 575.506.
128. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(3).
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The clear intent of this provision is to relieve a contract party of all obligations
to perform in the event that performance is prohibited by a presidential edict
issued pursuant to IEEPA. As is plainly stated, a contract party shall not be liable
in any court 129 for good faith compliance with an IEEPA order. It remains true,
however, that this provision is only applicable to U.S. courts; IEEPA section 2
alone will not suffice to excuse a party for nonperformance in a foreign court or
arbitral panel that is interpreting other than U.S. law. In such an instance, the
party may seek recourse to the excuse doctrine of force majeure.
2. Force Majeure
Force majeure is defined as "superior or irresistible force."' 30 Force majeure
clauses are common in export-import contracts because "in international trade
extraordinary obstacles to performance (such as war, Governmental intervention
of various kinds, currency fluctuations, and the like) are apt to present greater
hazards than in domestic transactions."' 31 The elements of force majeure have
been stated as follows: "First, a contingency-something unexpected-must
have occurred. Second, the risk of the unexpected occurrence must not have been
allocated either by agreement or by custom. Finally, occurrence of the contin-
gency must have rendered performance commercially impracticable."1 32
Because most countries have acted on the U.N. mandate and established
sanctions that bar business with Iraq and Kuwait, it is likely that a foreign
tribunal would recognize the international sanctions as activating a standard force
majeure contract clause.133 However, whether force majeure would be recog-
129. Section 1702(a)(3) speaks in terms of persons not being liable in any court, rather than
speaking specifically to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Despite this language, Congress surely could
not have intended this provision to represent an asserted extension of its power to determine judicial
jurisdiction to the courts of other sovereign nations.
130. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (5th ed. 1979).
131. Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in International
Trade, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1963). Excuse provisions are located in the Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-615(a), and the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG) art. 79(1). Note that the CISG will preempt domestic law and apply to a covered
contract unless the contract expressly provides that the CISG is inapplicable.
132. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (foot-
note omitted).
133. At least one court has indicated that regulations issued under the authority of IEEPA may be
sufficient to activate a contractual force majeure clause. See Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 566 F.
Supp. 1210, 1217-18 (D. Mass. 1983). Note, however, that force majeure is unlikely to be recog-
nized unless the party asserting force majeure has applied for a specific license from OFAC to cover
the transactions neccessary to perform the subject contract. Also, the force majeure issue could be
complicated by nonconformity between U.S. sanctions and those of other countries. While sanctions
relating to Iraq and Kuwait are mandated by U.N. Security Council Resolution 661, different
countries will interpret the resolution differently, and countries will disassemble their sanctions
differently once the sanctions are no longer mandated. Thus, for example, a foreign branch of a U.S.
firm could be covered by a U.S. sanctions prohibition that is not maintained by the host country. A
host country court could refuse to recognize force majeure on the basis that the U.S. prohibition is
an illegal assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Cf. Freuhauf Corp. v. Massardy, [1968] D.S. Jur.
VOL. 25, NO. 2
IRAQ/KUWAIT SANCTIONS 413
nized depends on a variety of factors including the terms of the subject contract,
the controlling law on force majeure, and the strength of the applicable country
sanctions. It should be recognized that force majeure has been held not to apply
in international arbitration proceedings concerning limited U.S. sanctions mea-
sures. 134
C. CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ
Many U.S. companies presently hold claims against the Iraqi Government
arising from its invasion and occupation of Kuwait. It appears that the U.S.
Government may be developing plans for consolidated procedures to adjudicate
these claims, possibly modeled on the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal es-
tablished after the Iranian hostage crisis pursuant to which U.S. claims have been
satisfied from a pool of frozen Iranian assets.' 35 In this regard, OFAC has
conducted a census of claims by U.S. persons against the Government of Iraq. 136
V. Conclusion
As an addition to the series of U.S. emergency economic sanctions, the
Iraq/Kuwait sanctions contain both conventional and unprecedented compo-
nents. The ISRs constitute punitive sanctions in a comprehensive state-they are
intended to disrupt economic intercourse between the United States and Iraq
almost to the greatest extent possible.
With the KACRs, however, the United States has established sanctions pro-
hibitions for an unusual purpose: to protect the assets of a foreign country. While
the KACRs employ the same tools and have the same appearance as standard
U.S. sanctions regulations, the reader must be prepared to approach them in light
of the policies they implement. Thus, for example, the specific license is used as
a broader instrument to authorize categories of transactions. Such broad specific
licenses should be used as authority for a range of transactions much like general
licenses.
147, [1965] J.C.P. 11 14274 bis, [1965] Gaz. Pal. (French Government forced French subsidiary of
U.S. corporation to take actions in performance of a contract, which actions were in violation of U.S.
economic sanctions against the People's Republic of China).
134. See National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 29 I.L.M. 565 (first arbitral award: force
majeure issue) (force majeure clause of oil exploration contract to which Libyan law applied was not
activated by (1) revocation of U.S. passport rights for travel to and in Libya, and (2) new U.S.
regulation controlling exports to Libya of products and technical data relating to oil exploration), 29
I.L.M. 601 (final arbitral award: remaining issues), 733 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1990) (judgment
confirming arbitral awards).
135. See generally Stewart & Sherman, Developments at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal:
1981-1983, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1983). There has been much speculation on whether the pool of
frozen assets of the Government of Iraq would be large enough to satisfy all legitimate claims against
the Iraqi Government. See, e.g., Daily Report for Executives (BNA), Feb. 11, 1991, at A-8. These
assets have been valued at approximately $1 billion by OFAC. Prepared Remarks, R. Newcomb,
OFAC, supra note 34.
136. See 56 Fed. Reg. 5636-41 (1991).
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Finally, unlike earlier sets of sanctions, the Iraq/Kuwait sanctions are an
integrated part of a coordinated multilateral effort. Therefore, unlike some ear-
lier sanctions, the Iraq/Kuwait sanctions are likely to be quite effective. With the
end of the Cold War, which usually scuttled earlier efforts to establish multilat-
eral sanctions programs, the Iraq/Kuwait program may be the blueprint for future
sanctions programs to address international aggression.
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